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 Securities law exists because of unique informational needs of investors. Securities 
are not inherently valuable; their worth comes only from the claims they entitle their owner to 
make upon the assets and earnings of the issuer or the voting power that accompanies such 
claims. The value of securities depends on the issuer's financial condition, products and 
markets, management, and the competitive and regulatory climate. Securities laws and 
regulations aim at ensuring that investors receive accurate and necessary information 
regarding the type and value of the interest under consideration for purchase. 
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Introduction 
 Securities exist in the form of notes, stocks, treasury stocks, bonds, certificates of 
interest or participation in profit sharing agreements, collateral trust certificates, 
preorganization certificates or subscriptions, transferable shares, investment contracts, voting 
trust certificates, certificates of deposit for a security, and a fractional undivided interest in 
gas, oil, or other mineral rights. Certain types of notes, such as a note secured by a home 
mortgage or a note secured by accounts receivable or other business assets, are not securities. 
 The increasing pace of economic integration across borders challenges the traditional 
concept of national regulation. Nowhere is this discrepancy between the global reach of 
markets and the national limits of regulation more manifest than in financial markets.   
 In order to develop effective proposals for standardization and unification of 
legislation on Securities it is necessary to analyze and review two largest systems of 
securities turnover, American and European and to reveal common and different 
characteristics in them. 
 
Comparing u.s. and eu regulations  
There are differences in securities rules and approaches on both systems as in US 
Securities regulations as in EU Securities regulations 
 Regarding the trading venues, MiFID is not currently applied to dark pools, while in 
the United States, dark pools are considered as ATS and register as broker dealers. They 
have to make their quotes available to the public above a certain trading volume threshold.  
 EU regulators have more discretion in authorizing investment firms and 
intervening in their management since they can judge whether the managers of investment 
firms or Regulated Markets are sufficiently experienced and reputable, while the U.S. 
regulator can only control their reputation and competences. The EU regulations go one-
step further in allowing supervisors to control the integrity of ultimate controllers of 
Regulated Markets regardless of their ownership, while the U.S. rules generally base the 
notion of control on ownership.  
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 Organizational requirements are broader in scope for exchanges in the United 
States and focus on disciplinary powers. This is explained by the self-regulatory role of 
exchanges in the United States versus a more limited role in the EU.   
  Capital  requirements  are  risk based  in  the  EU  and  based  on  the  concept  of 
maintaining a highly liquid core of capital in the United States.  
 The mitigation of conflicts of interest is a broad and general obligation for 
investment firms in Europe while it is focused on more specific situations in the United 
States.  
 Investor protect ion  rules in Europe are two tiered between retail and professional 
investors (client categorization is binding), while the U.S. regulatory scheme protects all 
investors, with some carve outs for institutional investors.  
 Best execution in the United States covers a number of factors, with price being 
typically the most important; in Europe price is one factor among others to assess whether the 
client has obtained the best possible result for the execution of its trade. In addition, under 
MiFID, investment firms are responsible for the best execution of client orders, while in the 
United States, the responsibility rests with trading centers.  This  provision  implies  that 
market  centers  in  the  United  States  need  to  link  and  route  orders  to  one another.  
Data consolidation on equity trades exists in the United States and not in the EU: 
in the United States, quotes and transaction data reported by national exchanges and 
associations are consolidated into a single system and disseminated to market participants, 
whereas in Europe, quotes and trades are fragmented between multiple trading venues and no 
consolidation is required. But   the   objectives   of   the   two   regulations   are   similar,   and   
some   outcomes   are comparable: Both  regulatory  systems  aim  to  maintain  fair  and  
orderly  markets,  protect investors, and provide price transparency.   
Equity securities are subject to more scrutiny and transparency requirements than 
bonds or derivatives. In the two regions, pre and post trade transparency requirements apply 
to equities while there is currently no or limited transparency requirements for derivatives 
and bonds. Reg NMS only applies to equities. Internalization is regulated solely are 
regards equity trades in Europe (concept of Systematic Internalizer).   
Investor protection regimes are broad   and   offer   better p r o t e c t i o n  t o  
individual investors, whether the rules to achieve such protection are strictly tiered or not.   
There are concerns on both sides regarding the fragmentation of oversight. The 
U.S. SEC does not oversee futures and government bonds; it also shares supervisory 
responsibility with the banking supervisors, which supervise commercial banks dealing with 
securities. In Europe, MiFID is implemented by 27 national supervisors which may lead to 
different interpretations. For instance, a  recent report by CESR emphasizes that  pre trade  
transparency waivers which exclude trading platforms from transparency requirements are 
interpreted differently across Europe; the report also hints at different interpretations of the 
concept of SI, given the few firms that have registered as SI (13 so far).49 A discussion on the 
outcomes cannot really be achieved without looking at the implementation of the securities 
regulations. Thus the study suggests some directions for future research: 
Assess enforcement on both sides, at the SEC and SRO level in the United States, 
and at the level of the 27 supervisors in the EU.  
Deepen  the  knowledge  of  dark  pools  on  both  sides  and  examine  how  to 
improve disclosure and price discovery. In   Europe   in   particular,   examine   ways   to   
achieve   quotes   and   trades consolidation.   
 
 
                                                          
49 CESR, “Impact of MiFID on Equity Secondary Markets Functioning,” June 10, 2009. 
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Conclusions for development of regulations 
 The Securities Law Legislation, should be compatible to the highest degree possible 
with the Unidroit Convention on Substantive Rules regarding Intermediated Securities 
(Geneva Securities Convention); however, within Europe we hope for a form of 
harmonization that focuses less on making divergent European legal systems compatible for 
its own sake and more on effective measures to ensure investor protection with minimum 
disruption to individual legal systems. 
 An SLL should apply to transferable securities: 
1.   As defined in directive 2004/39/EC, art. 4(18), i.e., securities that are capable of 
being credited to a securities account (Unidroit art. 1(a)); 
2.   That are dematerialized or immobilized pursuant to the pending CSD Regulation; 
3.   That are held by account providers that safe-keep and administer securities for 
account holders. 
 It should be recognized that legal systems at the national level determine legal 
requisites of title transfer.  Among other divergences, some legal systems involve trust 
concepts, and some do not.  It is not possible or necessary to harmonize these legal systems.  
Instead, to the extent possible, the focus should be on clarifying and harmonizing the moment 
at which legal title transfer occurs in order to protect investors, i.e., 
1. At the moment of settlement under the rules of the relevant settlement system 
(whether operating in the EU or not) and not on trade date or some other time; 
2. An Account Provider should undertake to debit or credit an Account Holder’s account 
on the moment of settlement, which should be determined with reference to the rules of the 
relevant settlement system, which in turn may be a designated settlement system under the 
Settlement Finality Directive or some other securities settlement system, including a non-EU 
system, as per the Third Country CSDs regime of the undertaken CSD Regulation; and 
3.  Account Providers and Account Holders should be able to rely with finality on debits 
and credits to relevant securities accounts, unless and to the extent necessary to correct an 
error. 
 There should be a clear distinction between (1) crediting and debiting of securities 
accounts, as dispositive incidents of transfer of ownership, whatever the underlying 
consideration could be (outright sale or title transfer collateral), and (2) the means of 
providing collateral under a security financial collateral arrangement, which operate to vest 
possession and/or control of the subject securities in the collateral taker and limit an account 
holder’s or third parties’ access to those securities.  In the former case, the circumstances 
under which an Account Holder’s ownership rights would arise and cease would be clarified.  
In the latter case, AFME believe this would further the twin objectives of (a) ensuring 
investor protection through clarity in respect of when ownership is actually transferred on the 
enforcement of a security interest by a collateral taker granted under a collateral arrangement 
and (b) clarifying that title does not transfer on the provision of securities as collateral under a 
security financial collateral arrangement under the Financial Collateral Directive.  AFME 
believes that the specificities of the manner in which securities may be effectively provided 
as collateral should be left to national law and the Financial Collateral Directive and, 
consequently, should be considered beyond the scope of the SLL. 
 The laws, regulations, rules and procedures governing the operation of an SSS should 
be clearly stated, understandable, internally coherent and unambiguous. They should be 
public and accessible to system participants. 
 The legal framework should include principles that support appropriate contractual 
choices of law in the context of both domestic and cross-border operations. In many cases, 
where otherwise appropriate, the law chosen will be that of the location of the central 
counterparty or a CSD 
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 Key aspects of the settlement process that the legal framework should support 
include: enforceability of transactions, protection of customer assets (particularly against 
insolvency of custodians), immobilization or dematerialization of securities, netting 
arrangements, securities lending (including repurchase agreements and other economical 
equivalent transactions), finality of settlement, arrangements for achieving delivery versus 
payment, default rules, liquidation of assets pledged or transferred as collateral, and 
protection of the interests of beneficial owners 
 In relation to collateral it should be made clear that an account holder’s creditor may 
enforce its rights against an account holder only in relation to the securities held by the 
account holder’s relevant intermediary, and not in the books of an upper-tier account 
provider, including where that account provider holds the debtor’s securities in segregated 
accounts. 
 The recognition of different holding structures (including via nominees and 
intermediaries, whether on a segregated or omnibus account basis), of foreign legal systems, 
without need of each legal system having to incorporate other structures and legal concepts 
into its own legal system, is indispensable to overcoming perceived legal barriers and to 
achieving increased efficiency and cost effectiveness; however, further steps of 
harmonization will be required to enable the unhindered exercise of rights attached to 
securities. 
 In respect of corporate actions-related requirements, any SLL should be compatible 
with developing market standards and guidance from market implementation groups. 
 In relation to corporate actions, as well as in relation to any instruction for the debit 
and or credit of a securities account, it must be made clear that the account provider may 
accept instructions only from the account holder or any person designated for that purpose by 
the account holder. 
 The Legal Certainty Group’s recommendations (in particular, recommendation 3) in 
respect of “core duties” of intermediaries, as set out in its Second Advice and as embodied in 
the Geneva Securities Convention, Article 10, should be adopted. 
 The EU Commission should adopt the legislative form of a Regulation, especially in 
respect of those parts of the legislation that must not suffer from incoherent transposition into 
national laws. 
 The proposed regulation of charges levied by an account provider is inopportune as 
the comparison with the payment area is inappropriate given the continued fragmentation, 
e.g., in the fields of company law and fiscal regimes. 
 Insolvency rules should be harmonised, between Member States, so that there is clear 
recognition of the segregation of financial instruments held by: (a) a firm for its clients, when 
acting in a custodial capacity; or (b) a CCP, in respect of client collateral. Minimal 
intervention would be required to settle a rule that would give greater assurance to investors 
in the Union and support the obligations already imposed on firms to achieve segregation. 
While title transfer and security interest arrangements should continue to be recognised, the 
presumption should be that a firm acting in a custodial capacity, which is under a legal 
obligation (whether statutory or contractual) to segregate client financial instruments, has 
done so. Accordingly, upon the insolvency of the firm, client financial instruments would be 
available to be returned, irrespective of the legal system under which they are held, in a 
consistent and certain manner. 
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AFME    (Association for Financial Markets in Europe) 
ATS        Alternative Trading System  
CAR       Capital Adequacy Requirement 
CDS       Credit Default Swaps  
SEC        The Securities and Exchange Commission  
CESR  Committee of European Securities Regulators 
DJIA       Dow Jones Industrial Average  
ECN        Electronic Communication Network 
EC          European Commission  
EU          European Union  
MiFID     Market in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC  
FESE       Federation of European Securities Exchanges 
MiFID  Market in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC  
NMS        National Market System  
Reg NMS    Regulation National Market System  
SEC   Securities and Exchange Commission  
SRO          Self-Regulatory Organization 
  
